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INTRODUCTION
An increasing consensus has arisen at the level of practice,
policy, and theory that the various mechanisms of transitional
justice should be mobilized as part of a response to violent
conflict and must serve as a pillar of postconflict peacebuilding.1
More than ever, the question is not whether there will be some
kind of transitional justice, but what the timing, modalities, and
sequencing might be and which of the mechanisms from the
transitional
justice
“toolbox”—including
trials,
truth
commissions, vetting and lustration, reparations, and broader
institutional reform—will be put in place. Together with
demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of excombatants, security sector reform, broader “rule of law”
programs, and elections, transitional justice initiatives have
become a routine part of the postconflict checklist.2 Viewed
from an historical perspective, the emergence of this transitional
justice consensus some twenty years after the term was coined is
nothing short of remarkable.3
Despite the seeming consensus as to the necessity to “do
something,” the increasingly privileged place of justice in
international affairs and postconflict reconstruction begs some
very important questions: justice for what, for whom, and to what
ends?4 In particular, while there is increasing momentum behind
1. See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice in a New Era, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 893,
894 (2002) (noting the emergence of a “steady State” phase of transitional justice in
which “the post-conflict dimension of transitional justice is moving from the exception
to the norm”); see also Rosemary Nagy, Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical
Reflections, 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 275, 276 (2008) (noting the standardization of
transitional justice).
2. See INT’L CRISIS GRP., LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE: REBUILDING FAILED STATES,
AFRICA REPORT NO. 87, at 9 (2004) (criticizing a mechanistic “operational checklist”
approach to postconflict peacebuilding in which the international community assumes
it can safely withdraw after rote implementation of a series of initiatives: deployment of
peacekeeping troops, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of excombatants, the repatriation and return of refugees and internally displaced persons,
security sector and judicial reform, transitional justice initiatives, and, finally, a first
election).
3. For an interesting discussion of how this seeming consensus masks a deeper
politicization and debate, see generally Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, The Irreconcilable Goals
of Transitional Justice, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 95 (2008).
4. See Nagy, supra note 1, at 280–86 (employing the categories of when, whom,
and what in order to challenge the “standardization” of the field of transitional
justice). For a discussion of the idea that it may not always be the case that we need to
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the notion that the tools of transitional justice must be
marshaled in response to large-scale human rights atrocities and
physical
violence—including
murder,
rape,
torture,
disappearances, and other crimes against humanity—the proper
role of transitional justice with respect to economic violence—
including violations of economic and social rights, corruption,
and plunder of natural resources—is far less certain. Indeed,
historically, economic violence and economic justice have sat at
the periphery of transitional justice work.5 To the extent that
transitional justice has dealt with economic issues, these
concerns have been treated as little more than useful context in
which to understand the perpetration of physical violence.6
Despite some increasing attention to the issue on the part
of academics and a handful of truth commissions, ignorance of
economic violence continues to be one of the principle blind
spots of the field of transitional justice, a bias that transcends
many of the debates and dilemmas of traditional transitional
justice theory and practice. While the blind spots of transitional
justice mirror historic divisions and hierarchies within
international human rights law, they also parallel the liberal
international peacebuilding consensus in which Western liberal
market democracy is assumed to be the ideal end product of
postconflict reconstruction and a “package” of interventions is
tailored to suit.7 This parallel suggests that despite some twenty
years of evolution, the field of transitional justice has not moved
far from its origins in which the “transition” in question was
assumed to be a transition to a Western-style liberal market
democracy.
As the field of transitional justice moves beyond its historic
origins in the wave of democratic transitions in Eastern Europe
and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, and away from its
“do something” in the transitional justice context, see PRISCILLA B. HAYNER,
UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 183–205 (2001).
5. See Louise Arbour, Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition, 40 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4 (2007) (discussing why “economic, social, and cultural rights
have not traditionally been a central part of transitional justice initiatives”).
6. See Zinaida Miller, Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional
Justice, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 266, 275–76 (2008).
7. See Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, 22 INT’L
SEC. 54, 56 (1997); see also Chandra Lekha Sriram, Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding
and Strategies of Transitional Justice, 21 GLOBAL SOC’Y 579, 580–81 (2007).
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roots in law and legalism, to a United Nations (“UN”)sanctioned global phenomena tied to conflict prevention more
generally, the almost exclusive emphasis on civil and political
rights and justice for physical violence appears increasingly
untenable. First, it is untenable because this emphasis provides a
distorted narrative of conflict premised on the notion that
economics and conflict can be neatly separated.8 When seen
through this lens, conflicts become one dimensional, when in
reality they are a messy and complicated mix of political, social,
economic, and cultural factors. Second, relegating economic
issues to the background of transitional justice limits and biases
the range of policies imagined to be necessary in the wake of
conflict. Because poverty and economic violence can be
associated with the onset of conflict, exacerbated by conflict,
and continue afterwards as a legacy of conflict, failure to strike a
better balance between a range of justice concerns in transition
is unlikely to generate policies and interventions that respond to
“root causes” and may serve to obfuscate and legitimate very
serious human rights abuses.9 The language of “never again” has
little meaning if the self-imposed blind spots of the field distort
our understanding of the conflict and limit our range of
possible solutions.
While greater inclusion of economic issues within the
transitional justice agenda therefore seems necessary, it also
raises difficult questions that have yet to be worked out at the
level of theory, policy, and practice. For example, while some
would find unobjectionable the idea that transitional justice
mechanisms should include in their ambit economic and social
8. See Miller, supra note 6, at 268.
9. See PAUL COLLIER ET AL., WORLD BANK, BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL
WAR AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 22 (2003) (arguing that civil wars are more likely in
low-income countries, have disastrous effects on poverty rates, and have negative effects
that persist well after formal cessation of hostilities). Collier once famously argued that
over fifty percent of civil wars reignite within a period of five years of their supposed
settlement. See Paul Collier & Anne Hoeffler, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, 46 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 13, 17 (2002). However, both figures have been disputed by some
and revised by Collier himself. See, e.g., Astri Suhrke & Ingrid Samset, What’s in a Figure?
Estimating Recurrence of Civil War, 14 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 195, 197–98 (2007)
(explaining how they and others have arrived at figures closer to twenty percent after
using the Correlates of War data set, and citing Collier’s 2006 working paper, which
established a twenty-three percent war recurrence rate for the first four years after the
cessation of conflict).
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rights violations that took place during the conflict itself—a
group of rebels stealing food from a village, for example, in
violation of the laws of war—the question arises as to whether we
should also include deeper issues of distributive justice and
structural violence that predate the conflict and that may have
in part helped to precipitate it. If we find ourselves focusing on
issues of deep-rooted structural violence, is this the proper work
of the field of transitional justice, or should it be left to the work
of “development” and longer-term political and social
processes? In sum, are we asking too much of transitional justice
by suggesting that it grapple with economic violence?
This Article seeks not to answer any of these questions
definitively, but argues that a more nuanced, contextualized,
and balanced approach to a wider range of justice issues faced
by societies in transition is necessary. To this end, this Article
proposes that one way to achieve a more balanced approach is
to reconceptualize and reorient the “transition” of transitional
justice not simply as a transition to democracy and the “rule of
law,” the paradigm under which the field originated, but as part
of a broader transition to “positive peace,” in which justice for
both physical violence and for economic violence receives equal
pride of place.10 Such a reorientation would not guarantee or
even mandate greater emphasis on economic concerns in all
cases. The notion of “positive peace” could ultimately be
subjected to limiting constructions and understandings that
would in effect reimpose a version of liberal international
peacebuilding, and thereby exclude many economic and
distributive justice issues from its purview. Nevertheless, I argue
that insofar as the very idea of “positive peace” has at its core
issues of structural violence, it calls upon one to attend to a
broader set of concerns than has historically been considered in
transitional justice practice. Reorientation around the concept
could be an important step in the direction of bringing

10. As discussed in greater detail below, the term “negative peace” refers to the
absence of direct violence. It stands in contrast with the broader concept of “positive
peace,” which includes the absence of both direct and indirect violence, including
various forms of “structural violence” such as poverty, hunger, and other forms of
social injustice. See generally Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE
RES. 167 (1969) (discussing different definitions of the word “peace” often used by
researchers).
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economic violence into the foreground of transitional justice
practice and policy.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets forth the
traditional focus and preoccupations of transitional justice, a
field which has historically been rooted in law, human rights,
and the felt imperatives of a political transition to Western
liberal democracy, but which is increasingly allied with broader
notions of peacebuilding. Part II discusses the relationship
between transitional justice and economic violence, a broad
constellation of issues that have largely been excluded from
transitional justice work to date. It articulates some of the
arguments against inclusion of economic violence and argues
that any costs are largely outweighed by the benefits. Part III
examines the relationship between transitional justice and the
emerging field of peacebuilding, including the critique of
liberal international peacebuilding, and sets forth the heart of
my argument that one way to promote greater focus on issues of
economic justice in transition would be to reconceptualize the
field of transitional justice as a transition to “positive peace.”
A note about terminology is in order before proceeding. In
this Article, the terms “physical violence” and “economic
violence” are used as shorthand to refer to a range of
phenomena. “Physical violence” refers to murder, rape, torture,
disappearances, and other classic violations of civil and political
rights. In contrast, “economic violence” refers to violations of
economic and social rights, corruption, and plunder of natural
resources. While the violence that characterizes “physical
violence” is often direct, “economic violence” is typically more
indirect. Both terms are clearly oversimplifications. For
example, not all violations of civil and political rights involve
direct physical violence, and many violations of economic and
social rights—hunger and starvation, for example—are arguably
a form of physical violence. While most of the “physical
violence” discussed in this Article constitutes a violation of civil
and political rights under international law, the concept of
“economic violence” includes, but is broader than, violations of
economic and social rights under international law.11
11. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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Nevertheless, as a form of shorthand, both terms constitute
loose categories that are useful to a discussion of the historical
emphasis and blind spots of the field of transitional justice.
I. THE ORIGINS AND PREOCCUPATIONS OF TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE
Many of the practices associated with the modern field of
transitional justice—trials, truth commissions, reparations
schemes, and broader reform of abusive institutions—have deep
historical roots.12 Nevertheless, transitional justice, as a domain
of policy, practice, and academic study, has its roots in the late
1980s and early 1990s with the wave of transitions in both
Eastern Europe and Latin America following the end of the
Cold War.13 Definitions of transitional justice vary and have
evolved and broadened over time.14 Broadly speaking,
“transitional justice” relates to a set of legal, political, and moral
dilemmas about how to deal with past violence in societies
undergoing some form of political transition.15 Arguments for
the necessity of some form of transitional justice are often
grounded in notions of atrocity prevention and deterrence
12. For a review of the use of what have become known as the tools of transitional
justice dating back to more than 2000 years ago in ancient Athens, see generally JON
ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(2004). Other authors looking to the historical underpinnings of transitional justice
practice identify the Nuremburg tribunal as a key juncture initiating the first “phase” of
transitional justice. See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 69, 70 (2003).
13. See generally I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
While the term “transitional justice” was coined some twenty years ago, it has been
argued that transitional justice did not coalesce as a distinct “field” until some time
after 2000. See Paige Arthur, How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual
History of Transitional Justice, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 321, 329–32 (2009) (tracing the history of
the use of the term “transitional justice”); Christine Bell, Transitional Justice,
Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’ 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 5,
7 (2009) (arguing that transitional justice did not emerge as a distinct field until after
2000).
14. Many of these definitions have been quite narrow and legalistic. For example,
Ruti Teitel defines transitional justice as “the conception of justice associated with
periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the
wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.” Teitel, supra note 12, at 69 (footnote
omitted). For a review of how some of these definitions have broadened over time, see
Nagy, supra note 1, at 277–78.
15. See Sriram, supra note 7, at 582–83.
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(“never again”), nation building (building or restoring
democracy and the “rule of law”), and moral necessity (just
deserts).16 While the precise type of political transition to be
undergone is not always made explicit, the transitional justice
practice, policy, and scholarship in the 1990s largely focused on
the felt necessities and dilemmas of a transition from more
authoritarian forms of government to Western-style democracy,
with a consequent focus on those mechanisms thought best to
bring about the specific political transition in question.17 As
discussed in greater detail below, the notion of transition as
transition to democracy was “crucial to structuring the initial
conceptual boundaries for the field.”18
Although a number of the concerns and preoccupations of
transitional justice were similar to those of the human rights
community from which many early transitional justice scholars
and practitioners were drawn, including particularly concerns
with accountability and impunity for massive human rights
violations, the field of transitional justice distinguished itself in
its attempt to balance twin normative aims: the demands of
justice and accountability on the one hand, and the assumed
needs of a political transition on the other.19 Thus, formative
debates in the field focused on the possible dilemmas and tradeoffs associated with justice in times of political transition,
including the so-called peace versus justice debate.20 Influential
16. See Bell, supra note 13, at 13 (discussing the different overlapping conceptions
of the field of transitional justice).
17. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 325 (arguing that transition to democracy was the
“dominant normative lens” through which political change was viewed in the early
years of transitional justice practice and scholarship); see also Patricia Lundy & Mark
McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up, 35 J.L. &
SOC’Y 265, 273 (2008) (arguing that “‘[t]ransition’, as normally conceived within
transitional justice theory, tends to involve a particular and limited conception of
democratization and democracy based on liberal and essentially Western formulations
of democracy”).
18. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 326.
19. See id. at 358.
20. In recent years, transitional justice advocates have tended to see the various
and sometimes contradictory goals of transitional justice as complementary. See
Leebaw, supra note 3, at 98. The mutually complementary nature of peace, justice, and
democracy has also become a United Nations (“UN”) doctrine at least since the 2004
publication of a report on transitional justice. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616
(Aug. 23, 2004) (arguing that “[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually
exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives”).
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articles by Guillermo O'Donnell and Samuel Huntington,
canonized in Neil Kritz’s seminal three-volume work, viewed the
parameters of justice in times of transition to democracy as a
function of a series of bargains between elite groups, with more
or less justice available depending on the extent to which elite
perpetrator groups were able to dictate the terms of the
transition.21
Although dealing with massive human rights violations
while undergoing a political transition might arguably call for
the range of expertise of a variety of professions and disciplines,
including history, psychology, economics, education, and
religion, to name only a few, early transitional justice advocates
were largely drawn from the legal and human rights
communities and early transitional justice scholarship was
primarily anchored in law and political science.22 Today, the
field of transitional justice is increasingly interdisciplinary, yet
law, legalism, and human rights approaches to the questions and
dilemmas of transition continue to dominate in many ways,
leading to a continued critique of the “narrowness” or
“thinness” of traditional transitional justice work and calls to
give greater attention to those issues often set in the background
of legal and human rights discourse, including religion, culture,
economics, and local tradition.23

21. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century, reprinted in I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES, supra note 13, at 65–81;
Guillermo O’Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, reprinted in I GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH
FORMER REGIMES 57, 57–64 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
22. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 333.
23. See Kora Andrieu, Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and
the Liberal Paradigm, 41 SEC. DIALOGUE 537, 541 (2010) (noting the “strong and
persistent influence of legalism on transitional justice”); Bell, supra note 13, at 9
(discussing the broadening of the field to include disciplines beyond law); Kieran
McEvoy, Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice, 34 J.L. &
SOC'Y 411, 417 (2007) (criticizing the legalistic penchant of transitional justice and
arguing that “legalism tends to foreclose questions from other complementary
disciplines and perspectives which transitional lawyers should be both asking and
asked”). See generally Wendy Lambourne, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass
Violence, 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 28 (2009) (calling for a revalorization of local
and cultural approaches to justice and reconciliation).
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Since the birth of the field in the 1980s and 1990s, the
more overt preoccupation with transition as transition to
democracy has receded. Increasingly, transitional justice is
associated with nation building and peacebuilding in the
postconflict context more generally.24 Once considered a
jurisprudence of exception and deviation from rule of law
standards in times of political transition, transitional justice has
been normalized, institutionalized, and mainstreamed.25 In
attempting to trace “three generations” of transitional justice,
starting with Nuremburg and moving into the present, Ruti
Teitel refers to this latest phase as “steady-state” transitional
justice in which the postconflict dimension of transitional justice
is moving from the exception to the norm.26 The “transition” in
transitional justice today is “ostensibly neutral” and the goals
promoted, including conflict resolution and the rule of law, are
less explicitly political.27 Other more recent and influential
definitions of transitional justice make little use of the concepts
of “transition” at all, rooting the field instead in the promotion
of a number of goals, including accountability and
reconciliation.28
The most iconic mechanisms associated with transitional
justice continue to be prosecutions and truth commissions.29
Beyond this, however, the field has broadened a great deal since
24. See Chandra Lekha Sriram et al., Evaluating and Comparing Strategies of
Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 13 (JAD-PbP, Working Paper Series No. 1, May
2009) (discussing increasing linkages between transitional justice and a broader set of
peacebuilding activities).
25. McEvoy, supra note 23, at 412. For an argument that the “dilemmas” of
transitional justice are not exceptional, but in fact resemble those of “ordinary justice,”
see generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice,
117 HARV. L. REV. 762 (2003).
26. See Teitel, supra note 1, at 894; Teitel, supra note 12, at 89–92.
27. Leebaw, supra note 3, at 103, 106.
28. For example, according to a landmark UN report:
[Transitional justice] comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of largescale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve
reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms,
with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and
individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform,
vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.
See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 20, ¶ 8.
29. See Ruben Carranza, Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with
Corruption and Economic Crimes?, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 310, 315 (2008).
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the early 1990s to include a range of mechanisms and practices
designed to encourage reconciliation and forms of
accountability far short of a prison sentence.30 Thus, fostering
community-level dialogue between former perpetrators and
survivors of human rights abuses and the construction of public
memorials to preserve memory of the conflict are as much a part
of transitional justice as a prosecution before a war crimes
tribunal. Despite new and innovative practices around the
margins, however, “steady state” transitional justice is
persistently criticized for being “top-down” and “one-size-fitsall,” rote application of a mere template to contexts and
situations to which it is perhaps ill-suited.31 It is perhaps to be
expected that as transitional justice becomes mainstream,
scholars and practitioners attempt to deconstruct the
assumptions, constructed boundaries, limitations, and blind
spots implicit in the template.
After several decades of evolution, transitional justice
practice and policy today is stitched together from strands of
overlapping and at times competing narratives. It is, at various
times, a battle against impunity rooted in human rights
discourse, a set of conflict resolutions techniques related to the
formation of a new social and political compact in the wake of
conflict, and a tool for international intervention and state
building.32 The multiplicity of narratives suggests an opentextured project subject to contest and reconceptualization. At
the same time, many transitional justice narratives share a
common denominator of being firmly grounded in neutral,
technical, and apolitical vocabularies of human rights and the
rule of law that have the potential to obscure the politics of the
transitional justice project itself.33 The decision to use the

30. See, e.g., BRIAN GORMALLY & KIERAN MCEVOY, THE COMMUNITY FOUND. FOR N.
IR., DEALING WITH THE PAST IN NORTHERN IRELAND ‘FROM BELOW’: AN EVALUATION
10–11 (2009).
31. See, e.g., Lundy & McGovern, supra note 17, at 271 (criticizing the “one-sizefits-all” and “top-down” approaches to transitional justice).
32. Bell, supra note 13, at 13–15.
33. Compare id. at 27 (showing how many concepts in traditional justice, such as
justice, democracy, and rule of law, often are contested concepts), with McEvoy, supra
note 23, at 420–21 (positing that “a crude characterization of human rights in
contemporary transitional justice discourses would suggest that human rights talk lends
itself to a ‘Western-centric’ and top-down focus; it self-presents (at least) as apolitical;
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mechanisms associated with the transitional justice template—
prosecutions, truth commissions, vetting and lustration, reform
of abusive security institutions—and not other mechanisms, just
like the decision to focus on abuses of civil and political rights
and not economic and social rights is itself a political choice
with important policy consequences that have implications for
distributive justice in the postconflict context. The next Part
explores the relationship between transitional justice and
“economic violence,” a category that subsumes a wide range of
issues rarely brought to the core of transitional justice work.
II. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE
As the Cold War recedes in time, conflicts across the globe
are increasingly intrastate in nature, less fueled by a grand
global ideological battle than by local struggles for resources
and control of government.34 The majority of these conflicts now
take place in some of the poorest countries on earth.35 As the
reports of media, human rights, and conflict resolution
organizations vividly illustrate, societies emerging from civil war
and other forms of conflict are often completely devastated:
civilians are killed and traumatized; infrastructure—from roads
and the electric grid to schools and hospitals—are destroyed;
and key institutions of governance are hollowed out by years of
[and] it includes a capacity to disconnect from the real political and social world of
transition through a process of ‘magical legalism’”).
34. This is not to minimize the legacies of colonialism and Cold War politics, or
the role of the modern-day scramble for resources in shaping many conflicts in the
developing world. Indeed, there has been a persistent failure of transitional justice
mechanisms to account for the effects of “outside actors” on the course of conflict. See
HAYNER, supra note 4, at 75–77. There are exceptions to this trend, however, including
Chad, Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
35. Many of the examples chosen in this Article are African, not because conflict
and transitional justice are unique to the continent, but because Africa provides some
of the starkest examples of the stakes of both violent conflict and the enterprise of
peacebuilding. Of the thirty poorest countries in the world, only two are located
outside of sub-Saharan Africa. Over half of all sub-Saharan Africans continue to live on
less than US$1.25 per day. Given the endemic poverty, Africa is a continent that can
scarcely afford to be made poorer by conflict. See U.N. Dev. Programme, Human
Development Report 2009, Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development, at 172–74
(2009),
available
at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009
(click
“Download” under “HDR 2009”); United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals
Report 2009, at 6 (2009), available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/
MDG_Report_2009_ENG.pdf.
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conflict, corruption, and mismanagement. Despite the best
efforts of local and international communities to build peace in
the wake of conflict, a significant number of these conflicts will
reignite in the years following their apparent settlement.36
Transitional justice and international prosecutions are, of
course, global phenomena. Nevertheless, for a number of
reasons, both political and economic, it seems likely that much
of their application in the coming years will be in the poorer
countries of the global south, particularly sub-Saharan Africa.37
The causes of the conflicts that lead to calls for the application
of transitional justice are multiple and complex, the full extent
of which is beyond the scope of this Article. While poverty and
economic violence are only pieces of this larger conflict
resolution puzzle, they remain important ones, central to
conflict dynamics in many countries.38 It is against this backdrop
of poverty and the persistent failure to resolve violent conflict in
so many parts of the world that economic violence in
“mainstreamed” transitional justice should be considered today.
A. Economic Violence in Transitional Justice Practice
Violent conflict devastates both lives and livelihoods, yet
ways of understanding what constitutes “violence” and who
counts as a “victim” vary a great deal. From the trials at
Nuremburg to the international criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to truth commissions in South
Africa and elsewhere, the conception of violence implicit in
most transitional justice initiatives has been an exceedingly
narrow one. The overwhelming focus of most transitional justice

36. COLLIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 155.
37. Indeed, the sheer number of indictments emanating from the International
Criminal Court involving African countries has generated significant controversy on
the continent, leading in part to an African Union vote to halt cooperation with the
court with respect to the indictment of Sudan’s Omar Al Bashir. See African Union in
Rift with Court, BBC NEWS, July 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
8133925.stm. Although countries such as China, Israel, Russia, and the United States
also would likely benefit from the application of transitional justice practices, greatpower politics and Security Council vetoes continue to make this appear less likely than
in the smaller, poorer countries of the world.
38. See COLLIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 20–31, 53 (arguing that civil wars are more
likely in low-income countries, have disastrous effects on poverty rates, and cause
negative effects that persist well after formal cessation of hostilities).

2012]

ADDRESSING ECONOMIC VIOLENCE

793

interventions across time has been on accountability for physical
violence—murder,
rape,
torture,
disappearances—and
violations of civil and political rights more generally.39 A broader
conception of violence that would encompass often equally
devastating forms of “economic violence”—including violations
of economic and social rights, endemic corruption, and largescale looting of natural resources such as oil, diamonds, and
timber—has been largely absent.
To take a famous example, under the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) Act, a “victim” was
limited to individuals who had suffered gross violations of
human rights, including killing, abduction, torture, or illtreatment.40 The social, economic, and political system of
apartheid, in many ways the very embodiment of the concept of
structural violence, was largely treated as context to instances of
egregious bodily harm that became the TRC’s principal focus.
When viewed through this lens, the quotidian violence of
poverty and racism, and the victims and beneficiaries of the
apartheid system itself, receded into the background.41 As we
approach two decades since the end of white rule in South
Africa, apartheid has ended, but the de facto economic and
social status quo has not changed to the degree many would
have hoped. Poverty, inequality, and crime remain high.42
Although transitional justice has addressed horrific forms of
violence in South Africa that took place under the apartheid
system, it also may have had the perverse effect of obfuscating
and legitimating other abuses of power, leaving many of those
who benefitted most from the apartheid economic system
comfortable in the status quo.
The “constructed invisibility” of economic concerns can
have serious long-term effects, both in terms of our
understanding of conflict itself and in terms of the remedies
thought necessary to prevent recurrence.43 As Zinaida Miller
39. See Nagy, supra note 1, at 284.
40. See Pablo de Greiff, Repairing the Past: Compensation for Victims of Human Rights
Violations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 1, 8 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).
41. See Nagy, supra note 1, at 284 (discussing the standardization of transitional
justice).
42. See Patrick Bond, Reconciliation and Economic Reaction: Flaws in South Africa’s
Elite Transition, 60 J. INT’L AFF. 141, 141 (2006).
43. See Miller, supra note 6, at 280–87.
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argues, pushing economic issues to the periphery of transitional
justice concerns helps to shape a distorted and one-dimensional
narrative of conflict in which economics and conflict can be
neatly separated.44 At best, economic issues become part of the
context, helping to explain why the physical violence that is the
focus of a truth commission’s work may have occurred, but are
of little further policy relevance. At worst, a truth commission’s
work may be almost completely decontextualized, presenting a
diagnosis of human rights violations that is abstracted from
reality and the dynamics of social power and conflict.45
If the dynamics that produced massive human rights
violations are poorly understood, creating a distorted narrative
of conflict that relegates economic issues to the background,
this may in turn limit and bias the range of policies imagined to
be necessary in the wake of conflict. When conflicts are viewed
through a one-dimensional lens, prevention of human rights
abuses becomes a simplistic function of punishment and
impunity. At the same time, the emphasis on physical violence
and violations of civil and political rights likely means that the
issues of economic violence and inequality that may have partly
helped to generate the conflict will go unaddressed by the
various mechanisms of transitional justice. Thus, we are more
likely to see a focus on prosecution of a handful of members of
abusive security services, vetting and dismissals, and perhaps
more general judicial and security sector reform than remedies
involving some measure of social restructuring, such as
affirmative action, redistributive taxation, or land-tenure
reform.46
Even where the mechanisms of transitional justice have
looked to economic violence as part of their work, the human
toll of economic violence rarely receives equal treatment when it
comes to the recommendations and policies that are articulated
as part of the work of prevention and follow-up. For example,
the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in
East Timor actually documented violations of economic and
44. See id. at 268.
45. Lisa J. Laplante, Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and
Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence Through a Human Rights Framework, 3 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 331, 337 (2008).
46. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 362.

2012]

ADDRESSING ECONOMIC VIOLENCE

795

social rights in some depth, yet when it came time to decide who
was a “victim” for purposes of receiving reparations, the
definition was limited to victims of violations of civil and political
rights.47 Whether justified under the banner of resource
constraints, such practices have the effect of promoting
hierarchies of rights and granting de facto impunity to the
architects of economic violence.48
Where transitional justice mechanisms do grapple with the
economic impacts of conflict and abusive governments, they
rarely do so using a human rights paradigm, even though many
of the abuses in question may constitute violations of
international law.49 Lisa Laplante, for example, explores how
truth commissions in Guatemala and Peru exposed decades of
structural violence and other socioeconomic injustices as one of
the causes of wars in their countries, but did not frame their
analysis or recommendations in terms of violations of economic
and social rights.50 While the work of these truth commissions is
important in that it can help provide “a causal connection
between violence and structural inequalities,” Laplante argues
that the failure to help different constituencies understand that
in many instances economic violence also constitutes a violation
of economic and social rights deprived “national groups a
47. See CHEGA! THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH, AND
RECONCILIATION TIMOR-LESTE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 40–41, 140–45 (2005).
48. Although formally the legal equal of civil and political rights, economic and
social rights often have been seen as second tier in a hierarchy of rights, as implied by
their designation as “second generation” rights.
49. Beyond the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
economic, social, and cultural rights have the status of binding law in a number of
international human rights treaties. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 13, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13;
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 4, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3;
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, arts. 7, 26, 40, 64, 67, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
G.A. Res. 61/106, arts. 2, 4(2), U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006); Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights art. 3, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69; European Social
Charter arts. 16–17, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89; African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights art. 20, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58.
50. See Laplante, supra note 45, at 335; see also Lisa J. Laplante, On the Indivisibility
of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and the Right to Development, 10 YALE HUM. RTS.
& DEV. L.J. 141, 148, 159–61 (2007) (providing a more detailed analysis of the work of
the Peruvian truth commission).

796 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:780
powerful lobbying tool to challenge the government’s inaction
or resistance.”51 Without rights-based scaffolding, subsequent
development programs and other initiatives targeting inequality
become mere charity or government largesse rather than
responses to concrete violations of international human rights
law to which individuals are entitled. By framing instances of
physical violence in terms of violations of rights, yet failing to do
the same with respect to violations of economic and social
rights, this approach further contributes to the conception that
economic and social rights are not “real rights,” but mere
aspirations.
B. Understanding the Marginalization of Economic Violence in
Transition
From the potential for deterrence inherent in criminal
prosecutions to the cries of “never again,” transitional justice
has long been rooted in the rhetoric of the prevention of future
abuses. Given the potential to misdiagnose the causes of conflict
and bias the necessary remedies, understanding why an entire
subset of issues so central to conflict dynamics—violations of
economic and social rights, corruption, and plunder of natural
resources—have historically been so far from the core of
transitional justice work and preoccupation is no easy task.
While the factors underpinning such a gaping blind spot are
many, this Article argues that there are at least two factors that
are central to understanding the marginalization of economic
violence in transitional justice work: (1) an importation of
implicit distinctions and hierarchies from mainstream human
rights discourse and practice, and (2) the consequences of
viewing transitional justice as a transition to a Western-style
democracy rather than a transition to “positive peace.”
International human rights discourse and practice selfconsciously wraps itself in an aura of impartiality and
universality. It is ostensibly apolitical, and the rights contained in
the core international covenants relating to both civil and
political as well as economic and social rights are repeatedly said

51. Laplante, supra note 45, at 350.
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to be “indivisible,” as per the UN mantra.52 In practice, the
seeming consensus regarding universality and indivisibility
masks a series of deep and abiding controversies and debates
relating to the proper place of economic and social rights under
international law. The Cold War roots of this debate, which split
the atom of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into two
separate covenants to be championed by competing world
powers, are well-known and will not be rehearsed here in
detail.53 Key for current purposes is the fact that the ripple
effects of the implied hierarchical distinction between so-called
“first generation” and “second generation” rights continue to
be felt many years after the Cold War’s end.
During much of the 1990s, the “formative years” for the
field of transitional justice, even the world’s largest human
rights organizations, Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, were slow to include documentation of violations of
economic and social rights in their work and did so only
gradually. Although some of this reluctance has been attributed
to “methodological difficulties,” it is also true that a number of
high-profile activists of the time, including Aryeh Neier, were
publically skeptical as to whether economic and social rights
were “real,” and staunchly believed that civil and political rights
should be the exclusive focus of human rights organizations
such as Human Rights Watch.54 As previously discussed, many
transitional justice scholars and advocates were drawn from the
human rights community of this period.55 One might add that
52. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23, ¶ 5, at 5 (July 12, 1993); see also
United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc A/RES/55/2 (Sept.
18, 2000).
53. See Arbour, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing the Cold War roots of the current
status of economic and social rights); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
54. See Curt Goering, Amnesty International and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
in ETHICS IN ACTION: THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 204 (Daniel A. Bell & Jean-Marc Coicaud eds.,
2007) (tracing the history of Amnesty International’s ambivalence towards economic
and social rights); see also Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63,
64 (2004) (explaining the particular methodological challenges associated with trying
to apply a “naming and shaming” documentation strategy to violations of economic
and social rights).
55. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 333.
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the historic ambivalence towards economic and social rights
within the human rights community mirrors a similar
ambivalence within mainstream justice and criminal law about
social justice more generally.56 It is perhaps not surprising,
therefore, that many of the lawyers drawn into the early human
rights movement may have brought this ambivalence with them.
While the implicit hierarchies of rights created by decades
of human rights practice are only slowly starting to unravel,57 the
backgrounding and foregrounding of economic and social
rights and civil and political rights in many ways mirror broader
trends in human rights discourse and practice, which were also
imported into transitional justice work. The following chart
summarizes the various historic dichotomies and oppositions
that have been broadly reflected in both human rights discourse
and practice and in transitional justice policy and practice.58

56. See Arbour, supra note 5, at 5.
57. Human Rights Watch, for example, has in recent years published a number of
reports looking at the linkages between natural resources, corruption, and violations of
economic and social rights. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Chop Fine: The Human Rights
Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria, 19 HUM.
RTS. WATCH, Jan. 2007, at 15–18, 40–53 (contending that the local government in
Rivers State, Nigeria, has violated its duty to progressively realize rights to health and
education through widespread and flagrant corruption and mismanagement of oil
revenues); Human Rights Watch, Some Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil
Revenue in Angola and Its Impact on Human Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. WATCH, Jan. 2004, at
57–59 (arguing that, due at least in part to mismanagement and corruption, the
government of Angola has impeded Angolans’ ability to enjoy their economic, social,
and cultural rights, including healthcare and education, in violation of the
government’s own commitments and human rights treaties to which it is a party). This
is in stark contrast to their work in the previous decade when violations of economic
and social rights would only be examined to the extent that they were associated with
violations of civil and political rights, such as racial or gender-based discrimination.
58. While in some ways a gross oversimplification, the implicit politics of human
rights discourse and practice that is embedded in these oppositions has long been the
subject of criticism. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement:
Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 109–10 (2002) (discussing the
foregrounding and backgrounding of human rights discourse); Makau Wa Mutua, The
Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA J. INT’L L. 589, 604–07 (1996) (criticizing the peripheral
nature of economic and social rights and local and traditional approaches to justice
under the mainstream Western approach to human rights thinking and practice).
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Set in the Foreground
Civil and political rights
The public
The state and
The individual
The legal
The secular
The international
The modern
Form, process, participation,
procedure
Institutional enforcement
Strict rules
Rights as neutral, apolitical
“trumps”
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Set in the Background
Economic and social rights
The private
The community,
group, corporation
The political
The religious
The local
The traditional
Substance
Cultural, social enforcement
Flexible standards
Rights as implicating hard policy
choices with political and
distributional consequences

Critical literature in both transitional justice and human
rights has attempted to bring elements of the background into
the foreground of thinking and policy.59 Thus, one persistent
trope in the critique of mainstream transitional justice is the
need to re-emphasize local rather than international agency,
and local cultural traditions of justice and reconciliation rather
than Western and international approaches.60 Similarly, there is
a critique of the more technocratic and legalistic bent of
mainstream transitional justice and an effort to underscore the
importance of considering local political contexts as well as the
political and distributional consequences of certain
approaches.61 In this way, one might situate the emerging
59. See generally Kennedy, supra note 58 (highlighting various arguments that
“circulate in the background of conversations about the human rights movement”).
60. For a review of some of the debates regarding the incorporation of local
justice mechanisms into transitional justice initiatives, see generally Roger Duthie, Local
Justice and Reintegration Processes as Complements to Transitional Justice and DDR, in
DISARMING THE PAST: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND EX-COMBATANTS 228 (Ana Cutter
Patel et al. eds., 2009).
61. See, e.g., Lundy & McGovern, supra note 17, at 273–74; McEvoy, supra note 23,
at 417–18.
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critique of the “constructed invisibility” of economic concerns
within transitional justice as part of a wider project of resistance
to mainstream transitional justice, which derives itself from
attempts to open up and democratize human rights discourse
and practice.
The thrust of the mounting criticism is not to delegitimize
that which has been traditionally placed in the foreground, or to
imagine that what has been placed in the background is
necessarily more “empowering.”62 All of the oppositions
provided in the chart above can be flipped and used as
platforms for contestation and resistance by marginalized
persons based on the times and needs of the situation. Thus, in
certain times and places, mobilizing the concept of the
“international” to counter strong appeals to local tradition
might serve an important emancipatory goal for oppressed
persons. At other times, taking shelter under the shield of the
“local” might be used to fend off invasive international
interventions that might reduce local agency and autonomy.
The key in illustrating these oppositions is to find a more
nuanced and contextual approach to the fundamental questions
raised by transitional justice: how should societies respond to massive
human rights violations and is it possible to do so in a way that will
build long-term positive peace? Central to this inquiry is the
consideration of the reasons for which certain issues have been
either backgrounded or foregrounded, and the distributional
consequences of placing an issue in either the background or
the foreground.
Beyond importation of implicit hierarchies from human
rights discourse and practice, the second factor key to
understanding the peripheral status of economic violence in the
transitional justice agenda is found in the notion of transition
itself. The idea of transition suggests a journey from a starting
point towards an unspecified destination. It suggests a period of
exception, of time-bounded rupture. While the exact duration
of the transition in question is never made explicit, the very
notion of transition might have the tendency to narrow one’s
temporal focus to a relatively brief period of the most egregious
abuses, excluding the potentially deep and complex
62. See Kennedy, supra note 58, at 110.
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socioeconomic roots of conflict, and to suggest measures that
are themselves narrowly time limited. Thus, transitional justice
institutions are more likely to view human rights abuses—
torture, for example—as functions of the excesses of certain
segments of the security sector or possibly on the orders of
higher-level government officials in an attempt to cling to
power, and not as deeper expressions of racism, rampant
inequality, historic deprivations, or other issues of structural
violence.
Because transition can also suggest a particular destination,
it may dictate in part the exceptional measures necessary to
reach the intended goal. Not only does the diagnosis affect the
prescribed remedy, but our very notion of what it means to be
healthy also helps determine the course or treatment. Thus,
Paige Arthur queries, how might the transitional justice
“toolbox” look different if the paradigmatic transitions in the
1990s were considered to be transitions to socialism rather than
transitions to democracy, and largely Western forms of
democracy at that?63 Might there have been a greater emphasis
on issues of distributive justice, including the need for
progressive taxation in countries experiencing radical
inequality, land-tenure reform in countries where land-based
conflict has been a driver of violence, and affirmative action in
countries with historically-marginalized classes? While one can
only speculate, what can be said is that the notion of transition
as transition to liberal Western democracy surely had a limiting
and narrowing effect on the “toolbox” that exists today.
C. Potential Objections to Greater Focus on Economic Violence in
Transition
Putting these historical constructions and limitations aside,
even while greater emphasis on issues of economic violence
within the transitional justice agenda seems necessary, striking a
better balance between physical and economic violence also
raises difficult questions that have yet to be worked out at the
levels of theory, policy, and practice. For example, while some
would find unobjectionable the idea that transitional justice
mechanisms should include within their ambit economic and
63. See Arthur, supra note 13, at 359.
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social rights violations that took place during the conflict itself—
a group of rebels stealing food from a village, for example, in
violation of the laws of war, or a warlord that sold off diamonds
and timber to buy weapons in similar violation—should we also
include broader distributive justice and structural violence issues
that predate the conflict, and which may have, in part, helped to
precipitate it?
We might characterize these two approaches as “thick” and
“thin” means of addressing economic violence in the
transitional justice context. Taking a relatively thin approach
and looking only at the economic violence perpetrated during
the conflict itself might prove to be relatively uncontroversial.
Suppose, however, that in a given country there is an attempt
during a transitional period to address some of the deeper
legacies of abusive systems of governance, such as income
inequality, the need for deeply redistributive taxation, and widescale land-tenure reform. Such was arguably the case in South
Africa at the end of apartheid, yet it is also recognized that
leaving the economic status quo largely intact was one of the
“bargains” struck and the price paid for a bloodless transition.64
While some have argued that addressing economic legacies of
conflict in transition might in fact enlist more support from the
general population and therefore be even more feasible than
seeking accountability for violations of civil and political rights,
this does not account for the role of elites.65 A group of elites
might be willing to see a handful of army officers or warlords
prosecuted, but attempting radical revision of the political and
economic status quo that has existed for decades might be
another story. In the end, many transitions depend in some
measure on the “buy-in,” or at least on the lack of resistance on
the part of elite constituencies. Thus, relatively robust or “thick”
approaches to addressing historical economic violence might
create the possibility of backlash, reanimating the “peace versus
justice” debate along economic lines.
While more evaluation and research would be needed to
predict the potential for backlash based on configurations of
elites and their role in the transition itself, it should be noted
64. See Bell, supra note 13, at 14.
65. See Roger Duthie, Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice,
2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 292, 307 & n.63 (2008).
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that the risk of a hostile and possibly even violent response is not
a dilemma unique to addressing economic violence in
transition. Indeed, much has already been said about how the
parameters of transition justice may be shaped by the extent to
which elites and perpetrator groups dictate the terms of the
transition.66 One might note, however, that in those few
instances
where
truth
commissions
have
made
recommendations related to addressing socioeconomic
inequalities, those recommendations tend to be ignored by
policy makers.67 This may be a more likely outcome than
backlash, although if framed properly, such recommendations
might nevertheless serve as a strong lobbying platform for civil
society actors who wish to press for reforms.68
Beyond the potential for backlash, one of the most
frequently noted objections relates to the additional cost and
complexity that would stem from an expansion of the mandates
of transitional justice mechanisms to include economic
violence.69 It is a fact widely noted that the costs of even a narrow
approach to transitional justice, particularly prosecutions, can
be enormous, especially at a time when most governments,
reeling from the effects of conflict, have little money to spare.70
Compounding the cost issue is the risk of expanding the
mandate of truth commissions and other transitional justice
mechanisms so broadly that it will be nearly impossible to fulfill
in the limited time typically allotted.71 It would seem sensible to
question whether this is really the context for trying to grapple
with “broad-based development or distributive justice policies
that aim to redress widespread violations of the economic and

66. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 21, at 65–81; O’Donnell & Schmitter, supra
note 21, at 57–64.
67. See, e.g., Laplante, supra note 45, at 350 (discussing how the Guatemalan
government largely ignored key recommendations of the Guatemalan Commission on
Historical Clarification, including a progressive tax system and increased state spending
on human necessities).
68. See id. at 333–34, 350.
69. See Rama Mani, Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus
Between Transitional Justice and Development, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 253, 256
(2008) (discussing the problems with the high cost of transitional justice measures in
development).
70. See id.
71. See Duthie, supra note 65, at 306–07.

804 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:780
social rights of poor citizens.”72 But while the cost and time
issues are far from specious, it should be noted that many
transitional justice mechanisms already are funded in part by
outside actors.73 It is quite possible that measures to address
economic violence in the transitional justice context would find
support from complementary constituencies, particularly insofar
as they touch upon questions of national economic
development. Some have also argued that attempting to recoup
money lost to economic violence in the form of embezzlement
and corruption could be one way to help fund transitional
justice initiatives focusing on economic issues.74
There are also broader concerns associated with the
dilution of the transitional justice enterprise. If one were to take
a robust or “thick” approach to economic issues during periods
of political transition, shifting the paradigm from transition to
what some have called “transformation,” at what point does this
better suit the work and expertise of traditional economic
development actors and longer-term political and social
processes?75 Seeking accountability for physical violence alone
has been a monumental task, but over several decades, this work
has made an impact on the normative and institutional global
landscape.76 That is no small achievement, and trying to do too
much could risk even the modest change that has been
achieved. As Naomi Roht-Arriaza has argued, “broadening the
scope of what we mean by transitional justice to encompass the
building of a just as well as peaceful society may make the effort
so broad as to become meaningless.”77

72. Id. at 299.
73. See id. at 302–03.
74. See Carranza, supra note 29, at 324–25.
75. See Lambourne, supra note 23, at 46 (advocating a “transformative” justice
model of transitional justice); see also Laplante, supra note 45, at 332 (arguing that truth
commissions might contribute to longer-term processes of political and economic
transformation).
76. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE
1, 1–8 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006). See generally KATHRYN
SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING
WORLD POLITICS (2011) (discussing accountability in the context of prosecutions for
human rights abuses).
77. Id. at 2.
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While concerns that transitional justice efforts may become
too diffuse need to be taken seriously, the global project of
transitional justice cannot be made more meaningful, and the
world made more just, if a significant portion of the drivers of
conflict and resulting violations of international law are pushed
to the side. There will always be a risk of trying to do too much,
wagering the legitimacy and capital of the transitional justice
enterprise by reaching beyond the possibilities for social and
political change at any given time. The point, however, is that
the dividing line between too much and too little transitional
justice should not be an arbitrary one based on distinctions
between physical and economic violence. Rather, it should be
based on a careful analysis of the drivers of conflict and the
social, political, and financial capital that can be marshaled to
effect change via the various mechanisms of transitional justice
in the wake of conflict.
In the end, working through these and other questions
related to the wider acknowledgment of economic and social
rights at the level of theory, policy, and practice will require
years of effort and study. In this sense, they are little different
than the dilemmas and trade-offs associated with civil and
political rights in the transitional justice context, most of which
have yet to be fully worked out some twenty years after the birth
of the field. Key to providing the impetus for such a complex
and sustained process will be a change in thinking about the
nature of the transitional justice enterprise and the notion of
transition itself. The following Part explores what it might mean
to reframe transitional justice not as a transition to democracy,
the rule of law, or some kind of postconflict stability, but as a
transition to “positive peace.”
III. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, PEACE, AND PEACEBUILDING
In the context of transitional justice debates, the concept of
“peace” has at times been mobilized as one of resistance to the
advance of particular transitional justice mechanisms and
policies.78 This is manifest most clearly in the so-called “peace
versus justice” debate, in which some form of transitional justice,
78. See, e.g., CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS: JUSTICE VS PEACE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION (2004).
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typically a prosecution, is imagined to stymie or preclude
chances for a negotiated peace agreement.79 The debate also
arises when it comes to the choice as among different elements
of the transitional justice “toolbox,” including whether to have
prosecutions or a truth commission and whether to have
international prosecutions or mechanisms of accountability
rooted in local tradition and custom.80 While there are an
increasing number of concrete examples in which prosecutions
have arguably advanced the cause of peace, and while the UN
has officially embraced the notion that peace and justice are
mutually complementary, the “peace versus justice” debate has
proved to be an enduring one, resurfacing most recently in
International Criminal Court indictments of Omar Al Bashir of
Sudan and Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army in
Uganda.81
The concept of peace is not part of the daily working
vocabulary of many lawyers and human rights advocates who

79. As an example of this phenomenon, in 2003, the then-chairman of the
Economic Community of West African States, President John Kufuor of Ghana, urged
the UN to set aside the indictment of Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra
Leone on the grounds that it was necessary to facilitate a negotiated settlement to
Liberia’s civil war. See Liberia: ECOWAS Chairman Urges UN to Lift Taylor Indictment, IRIN
HUMANITARIAN NEWS & ANALYSIS, http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?
reportid=44642 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
80. Increasingly, there is a recognition that no one mechanism of transitional
justice can hope to fulfill the many aspirations ascribed to it, and multiple overlapping
mechanisms are thought to be necessary. For an exploration of the “truth versus
justice” debate, see generally Miriam Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crimes: A
Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39 (2002); Reed
Brody, Justice: The First Casualty of Truth?, NATION (New York), Apr. 30, 2001, at 25. For
an argument that international prosecutions can subvert local judicial and
reconciliation practices while unwittingly playing into national-level politics, see
generally Adam Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS
& INT’L AFF. 179 (2007).
81. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 20 (positing that “[j]ustice, peace
and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing
imperatives”); PRISCILLA HAYNER, CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE & INT'L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, NEGOTIATING PEACE IN LIBERIA: PRESERVING THE POSSIBILITY
FOR JUSTICE 8–9 (2007) (arguing that the indictment of Charles Taylor advanced the
peace process in Liberia, even though it was criticized at the time as potentially
undermining peace negotiations); Louise Arbour, Editorial, Justice v. Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/opinion/16iht-edarbour.
1.16197765.html (justifying her decision to indict Slobodan Milošević by showing that it
ultimately advanced the cause of peace, even though it was criticized at the time for
threatening the peace process).
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comprise the communities that provided the initial intellectual
capital to the transitional justice enterprise, and few transitional
justice scholars today situate their work in the context of peace
or peacebuilding.82 Nevertheless, the notion of peace is perhaps
no more or less nebulous than the concepts of “justice,”
“accountability,” “reconciliation,” and the “rule of law” that
typically pepper transitional justice discourse. Although rarely
defined as such, the concept of peace that is put in opposition to
justice in the context of the “peace versus justice” debate is
typically that of “negative peace,” meaning the absence of direct
physical violence.83 Thus, if the threat of prosecution is feared to
prevent a group of rebels from signing a peace agreement, and
the guns may keep firing, justice could be said to undermine
(negative) peace.84 A similarly narrow view of peace can be
found when Ruti Teitel expresses the fear that as transitional
justice mechanisms become increasingly associated with nation
building, transitioning societies will give up on the “ambitious
goals of establishing the rule of law and democracy” in favor of
the more modest aims of “maintaining peace and stability.”85
The notion of negative peace that has often been employed
in transitional justice discourse and debates is a much narrower
concept of peace than the notion of “positive peace” discussed
in this Article, which involves not just the silence of AK-47s and
the absence of the direct violence of hot conflict, but also the
absence of more indirect forms of violence, including forms of
structural violence such as poverty, corruption, radical
economic, social, civil, and political inequalities, and other
forms of social injustice.86 Positive peace may well embrace, but
82. Andrieu, supra note 23, at 539 (noting that “few transitional justice scholars
have yet situated their research in the context of peacebuilding, seeing it instead
through the dominant lens of legalism and human rights”); see Lambourne, supra note
23, at 29 (explaining that “few researchers have analysed the relationship between
justice, reconciliation and peacebuilding”).
83. See Galtung, supra note 10, at 2; Lambourne, supra note 23, at 34.
84. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman & Alexis Okeowo, Warlord’s Absence Derails Another
Peace Effort in Uganda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2008, at A9 (discussing the refusal of Joseph
Kony, leader of a rebel group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army that is responsible
for widespread human rights abuses in Uganda and neighboring countries, to attend
peace negotiations due in part to indictments from the International Criminal Court).
85. Teitel, supra note 1, at 898.
86. See generally Galtung, supra note 10 (discussing different constructions of
“positive peace” and “negative peace”).
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is broader than, many of the traditional goals of transitional
justice, including establishing democracy and building the rule
of law. After all, there are many modern democracies in which
the rule of law is firmly established that nevertheless manifest
high levels of poverty and other forms of structural violence.
Without making use of the term, transitional justice
advocates often seem to assume that accountability will lead to a
type of positive peace.87 Thus, for example, the concept of peace
might be marshaled by the advocates for transitional justice as
part of an argument that a potential amnesty agreement will not
secure “lasting peace” or that the particular type of justice to be
meted out by transitional justice mechanisms is necessary to
“long-term peace.” It is perhaps then assumed that the
transition that is set in motion will allow the type of social and
economic development that may lead to positive peace. As
Alexander Boraine has argued, “[t]he overall aim [of
transitional justice] should be to ensure a sustainable peace,
which will encourage and make possible social and economic
development.”88 More typically, however, transitional justice
advocates debate issues of amnesty and prosecutions in a more
legalistic idiom, asking, for example, whether there is a duty to
prosecute under international law, or whether amnesties are
compatible with international law.89 In these discussions,
broader notions of peace are often relatively absent.
A. International Peacebuilding
The concept of positive peace overlaps but is not
synonymous with the evolving concept and field of
peacebuilding. At the international institutional level,90 the field
and practice of peacebuilding in the postconflict context
evolved out of the much more limited peacekeeping operations
87. See Alexander L. Boraine, Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation, 60
J. INT’L AFF. 17, 26 (2006).
88. Id.
89. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (discussing the duty to
prosecute or grant amnesty under international law).
90. This Article distinguishes between peacebuilding at the “international
institutional level,” which emanates in large part of the United Nations, and the various
types of interpersonal, community-level, and “track-two” peacebuilding that are done
by individuals, religious groups, and nongovernmental organizations.
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of the Cold War, in which neutrality, consent, and minimum
force were considered paramount (often referred to as “firstgeneration” peace keeping).91 With the end of the Cold War,
these limited operations soon gave way to more complex and
multidimensional initiatives in which the UN was called upon to
address underlying economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian
problems inextricably linked with local politics. The seemingly
inevitable involvement in increasingly complex postconflict
initiatives culminated in the 2005 creation of the United Nations
Peacebuilding Commission, which has been tasked with
facilitating integrated approaches to postconflict reconstruction
throughout the UN system and beyond.92
The term “peacebuilding” was not defined as part of the
Peacebuilding Commission’s creation, but has continued to
evolve along with emerging policy and practice. According to a
working definition adopted by the UN Secretary-General’s
Policy Committee in 2007, it “involves a range of measures
targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict
by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict
management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace
and development.”93 Despite the apparent breadth of this
working definition, at the level of major international
institutions, including the UN and multi- and bi-lateral donors,
peacebuilding today typically consists of a more-or-less
standardized package of initiatives that include demobilization,
disarmament, reintegration, security sector reform, broader
“rule of law” initiatives, elections, and, increasingly, the various
mechanisms of transitional justice.94 In this way, transitional
justice initiatives have become a routine part of the “postconflict

91. Some refer to three different generations of peacekeeping, which evolved in
quick succession in the early 1990s. See, e.g., SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE:
THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING 238
(2004). Others, such as Roland Paris, distinguish between “traditional peacekeeping”
and “peace operations.” See Roland Paris, Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global
Culture, 9 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 441, 448–50 (2003).
92. See G.A. Res. 60/180, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180 (Dec. 30, 2005);
S.C. Res. 1645, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005).
93. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 18
(2008), available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.
94. See Nagy, supra note 1, at 280 (noting various transitional justice initiatives
associated with peacebuilding).
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checklist” that
peacebuilding.95

is

associated

with

liberal

international

B. Using a Positive-Peace Paradigm
The principal contention of this Article is that one way of
giving equal pride of place to justice for both physical and
economic violence in the transitional justice context, thereby
creating a more balanced approach to both civil and political
and economic and social rights, would be to reconceptualize
transitional justice not as a simply political transition,
democratic or otherwise—the paradigm out of which the field
evolved—but as part of a broader transition to positive peace.
Under this paradigm, the conception of justice shifts from
“justice for or in transition” and “justice versus peace” to
“justice for positive peace.” Grounding the field in such a
conception would be one way of helping to push past the
boundaries of mainstream transitional justice and liberal
international peacebuilding.
Anchoring the field of transitional justice in the concept of
positive peace could potentially have at least three positive
effects. First, it would likely broaden the approach from a
relatively narrow and legalistic one focused on physical violence
and civil and political rights to one that would also grapple,
where appropriate, with the socioeconomic underpinnings of
conflict, including various forms of structural and economic
violence. Second, as the achievement of positive peace is a longterm endeavor, the notion of justice for positive peace implies
preventative strategies that look beyond the confines of an
unspecified political transition. In doing so, transitional justice
mechanisms may be conceptualized more holistically to blend
with ongoing development and peacebuilding initiatives
associated with postconflict reconstruction, and may potentially
be marshaled in an effort to address the ongoing violence and

95. See Andrieu, supra note 23, at 538 (describing how transitional justice has
become “an apparatus within the wider peace building ‘package’”); Sriram, supra note
7, at 585 (arguing that “responses to recent mass atrocities or human rights abuses are
now an integral part of peacebuilding by bilateral donors, regional organisations, and
international institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank”).
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criminality that is typically associated with postconflict
situations.96
Third, the notion of justice for positive peace suggests that
the determination of the modalities and mechanisms of
transitional justice should be grounded in a context-based
inquiry into the particular roots and drivers of the conflict in
question. This stands in contrast to a package of mechanisms
drawn from a toolbox of “best practices” with some sort of
predetermined political endpoint, be it elections or democracy,
or based on a more abstract set of deontological goals, including
accountability and just deserts. Best practices, packages, and
toolboxes in one country might have little relevance to building
positive peace in another. For example, Paige Arthur has
speculated that while many of the dominant themes and
responses to violence of mainstream transitional justice evolved
out of the Latin American experience, these responses might
not be optimal for countries with “different histories, cultures,
and positions within the world economy.”97 Many countries in
Africa with a history of neopatrimonial government, corruption,
and very weak state institutions might need to focus on a
different set of issues through a different set of mechanisms.98
Focusing on positive peace as the ultimate goal of the
mechanisms of transitional justice could be one way to refocus
attention on the context-specific interventions needed to move
in that direction.
A paradigm shift in the direction of positive peace would
not dictate a “thick” or “thin” approach to economic violence in
transition, or even ensure that economic violence would be
addressed at all. As with all transitional justice mechanisms and
modalities, the needs and limits of the context would have to be
considered. Depending on the context, addressing economic
violence might not always be necessary, or even desirable. As
96. For a more detailed look at potential connections between transitional justice
and development, see generally Duthie, supra note 65 (arguing that transitional justice
measures should be designed and implemented in a way that focuses on a synergistic
links between transitional justice and development); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
DEVELOPMENT: MAKING CONNECTIONS (Pablo de Greiff & Roger Duthie eds., 2009)
(discussing the issues and considerations arising from the connection between
transitional justice and development).
97. Arthur, supra note 13, at 360.
98. See id. at 361.
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Chandra Lekha Sriram argues, simply presuming that more
justice necessarily generates or equates to more peace is
potentially problematic.99 This presumption should be avoided
with respect to both mainstream transitional justice and a more
holistic form of traditional justice that would also grapple with
legacies of economic violence in transition.
C. The Critique of Liberal International Peacebuilding
In attempting to ground the field of transitional justice in a
paradigm of positive peace, it is important to be wary of limiting
constructions in which the notion of positive peace would simply
be reshaped to fit and support existing practices and paradigms.
Despite the potentially expansive nature of the field and
concept of peacebuilding as discussed above, a trenchant
critique has been that actual peacebuilding practice, if not
theory as well, tends to reflect a paradigm of liberal
internationalism in which faith in market economies and
Western-style liberal democracy is conceived as the unique
pathway to peace.100 Because many developing countries have
little experience with democracy, the emphasis on elections,
democracy, and free markets associated with the typical package
of postconflict peacebuilding interventions can be both
dangerous and destabilizing.101 In a number of ways, the critique
of liberal international peacebuilding parallels the critique of
mainstreamed transitional justice, in which the transition is
implicitly conceived of as a transition to Western liberal
democracy and elements of economic violence and social justice
are moved to the periphery.102
These historic constructions of the fields of transitional
justice and peacebuilding illustrate how the concepts of peace,
peacebuilding, and justice can be marshaled in ways that are
both limiting and expansive; ways that can empower but also can
obfuscate hierarchies of power and further perpetuate
99. Sriram, supra note 7, at 580.
100. See Paris, supra note 7, at 56; see also id., supra note 7, at 580.
101. For this reason, Roland Paris advocates what he calls “institutionalization
before liberalization,” which would prioritize strengthening institutions and
regulations before any rush to elections. See Paris, supra note 7, at 57–58.
102. For a more elaborate discussion of this point, see generally Sriram, supra
note 7.
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inequalities. Thus, any attempt to build the notion of
transitional justice as transition to positive peace requires special
attentiveness to these dynamics. Nevertheless, one might argue
that the benefit of the positive-peace paradigm is not that it
offers a concrete goal that is any more precise or less subject to
being co-opted than “justice,” “democracy,” “reconciliation,” or
the “rule of law.” In the end, these may all be “essentially
contested concepts.”103 At the same time, because the very core
import of the concept of positive peace calls upon one to attend
to a broader set of concerns than has historically been the
practice of both liberal international peacebuilding and
mainstream transitional justice, it may offer a better starting
point than existing paradigms.
CONCLUSION
In the last two decades, the field of transitional justice has
distinguished itself from its parent field of international human
rights, in part due to its more overt grappling with the hard
policy choices that lie at the intersection of law and politics and
of justice and peace. At the same time, there has been an
implicit politics at work in the backgrounding and
foregrounding of various aspects of transitional justice concern.
If mass atrocities and physical violence have been placed in the
spotlight, issues of equally devastating economic and social
justice have received little attention.
The choice of which justice issues to focus on in a given
context, be it physical violence, economic violence, or some
combination of the two, is itself a political choice with
distributional consequences. The goal of reorienting transitional
justice as a transition to positive peace is not to remove politics
or pretend that transitional justice is or ever could be an
apolitical project. Rather, the concept of positive peace calls
upon us to be attentive to these choices, whether justice is
imagined to serve the needs of a political transition to liberal
market democracy, or something else. Thus the goal is not to do
away with politics, but to bring them back to the surface and free
them from the confines of a technocratic and legalistic discourse

103. Bell, supra note 13, at 27.
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that too often serves to obscure and legitimize the implicit
politics at work.
While addressing a wider range of justice concerns than has
previously been the case will create serious challenges, failure to
address these concerns may ultimately undermine the goals of
transitional justice itself, including the prevention of a relapse
into conflict. The hope therefore is to replace the historic
emphasis and exclusion of economic violence with a more
nuanced, contextualized, and balanced approach to the full
range of justice issues faced by societies in transition. In this, we
would take one step forward in moving beyond the constructed
and self-imposed blind spots and biases of the field of
transitional justice.

